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A. Douglas Melamed and David Westin t
In the introduction to his book, Tort Law in America,' Professor G.
Edward White disclaims the "staggering task" of writing the history of
tort law. He nevertheless gives himself a substantial assignment: to write
an intellectual history of torts in America, describing the "way the subject
of torts has been conceived" and "why [tort rules and doctrines] changed
and who did the changing." 2 Professor White assumes that the origins of
"dominant theories of tort law" can be traced to the writings of a small
but influential group of persons, particularly law professors at Harvard,
Columbia, Yale, and the University of Pennsylvania and judges of state
courts in New York and California.3 What Professor White has given us,
therefore, is a synopsis of the writings of those whom he considers to be
the leading American tort law theoreticians from 1850 to the present.
I
White succeeds admirably at his first task, describing how the subject of
torts has been viewed by leading torts theorists. Although his tour contains
few surprises, he has managed to pull together a disparate range of mater-
ials and to articulate a plausible scheme for cataloging them.
White divides his intellectual history of torts into four periods. The
first, from 1850 to 1910, he labels the era of "conceptualism," during
which torts first developed as an "independent branch of law." White at-
tributes this development, and much of what followed during the era of
conceptualism, to the reaction of intellectuals to the decline of both relig-
ion and a natural-law view, which had been unifying forces in America.
In order to fill the void left by tle weakening of these forces, conceptualist
torts theorists attempted to develop what White calls "comprehensive the-
ories of potentially universal applicability."' The main principle of liabil-
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ity in tort that emerged from this period was the principle of negligence,
which Holmes and others took from vague suggestions in preconceptualist
decisions and transformed into a universal and "comprehensive" doctrine.
Like others who have written before him,' White describes a new pe-
riod, beginning in the second decade of the twentieth century, in which
conceptualism gave way to "realism." During this era, which lasted until
the end of the Second World War, torts scholars and others came to reject
the comprehensive, universal doctrines developed over the preceding sixty
years. At first, the realists objected, not to universal principles as such, but
rather to the failure of the particular principles that their predecessors
developed to speak to contemporary needs. White argues that by the
1930s, however, the realists rejected the very notion of universal doctrines
as obscuring what they saw as the essence of legal decisionmaking: legal
process and its effect on individual litigants in individual situations. Real-
ist influence fundamentally altered the negligence principle developed by
the conceptualists by removing its premise of a universal duty owed to all
and putting in its place a "relational" concept of negligence in which the
magnitude of the risks to which a particular plaintiff was exposed and the
social worth of the class to which he belonged were balanced against the
utility of the defendant's conduct.' Moreover, realist legal scholars gave
greater recognition to notions of strict liability.7
After the Second World War, realism in turn gave way to what White
calls the period of "consensus thought," which lasted for twenty-five
years. Unlike its predecessor, consensus thought did not break radically
with the views and attitudes that immediately preceded it. Consensus
thinkers kept much of the substance of the realists' work but, unlike the
realists, focused on explaining changes in tort law through the processes
and institutional settings that gave rise to them. Although the consensus
thinkers saw their project as descriptive in nature, White argues, prescrip-
tive implications were never far from the surface.' Where the realists had
seen much that was ad hoc and non-rational in legal decisionmaking, con-
sensus thinkers found rationality, consistency, and predictability in judi-
cial decisions. Consensus thinkers apparently had little effect on substan-
tive negligence doctrine, but judges in this period expanded the scope of
strict liability in reliance on insights of realist scholars.
Finally, White describes the period from 1970 to the present as one
characterized by the return of conceptualism or, as he puts it, "neoconcep-
tualism." According to White, neoconceptualism has not yet made a sub-
5. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
6. P. 107.
7. Pp. 109-10.
8. See pp. 139-53.
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stantive mark on tort law, in part because there is no agreement among
neoconceptualists on the universal principles or doctrines to be pursued.
Despite their disagreement about whether torts principles should promote
efficiency or admonish defendants for blameworthy conduct, neoconceptu-
alist scholars stand on common ground in their efforts to articulate over-
arching legal principles, often drawn from the insights of other disciplines
such as history or economics. For his part, White finds all conceptualism
inadequate because, he believes, the conceptualists' search for unifying
principles cannot serve the diverse purposes and needs of tort law.9
II
Professor White is less successful in explaining why tort doctrines
changed and who changed them. In fact, he offers no convincing explana-
tion of the reasons for change, and he assumes without justification or
explanation the identity of those who did the changing.
One problem is that the book is badly written, and the problems with
the writing make it nearly impossible at critical points to know what
White means to say. The book is riddled with opaque terms used without
definition or explanation. Thus, for example, White repeatedly exalts the
"integrity" of tort law10 without making clear whether he means its coher-
ence over time, its resistance to infiltration by ideas from other bodies of
law, or something else entirely. Similarly, White places heavy emphasis
throughout his book on a distinction between "public law" and "private
law." But it is not until late in the book that he even briefly explains
that his distinction between "private" and "public" depends on whether
the law is intended to deal with "two-party private relations" or "multi-
party public relations" among persons who are not parties to the litiga-
tion.12 Evidently the distinction for White between "public" and "private"
law is not affected by whether the law was made by courts or by legisla-
tures or by whether the law is rooted in legal obligations created by pri-
vate conduct or by public intervention.
More than just individual terms remain obscure in White's work.
Whole sentences are incomprehensible. No one, except perhaps Professor
White, could tell us what it means to say that tort law's "integrity, and its
amorphousness as well, can be linked to the place of injury in American
life."" Nor has White told us anything by saying that "[r]ealism pro-
foundly altered the intellectual foundations of twentieth-century tort law,
9. See pp. 215-30.
10. Pp. xvi, 164.
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but did not fundamentally change its conceptual apparatus."' 4
White's lack of precision sometimes leads to apparent contradiction. For
example, White writes that Judge Andrews' opinion in Palsgraf'5 "was
explicitly an exercise in interest-balancing," but in the very next para-
graph he asserts that Andrews' opinion failed to concede that "the process
of resolution was explicitly one of interest-balancing."' 6
Imprecision and lack of clarity mar the organization of the book as
well. White covers the four basic periods of tort theory in five chapters.
Chapters one and two are given to conceptualism; chapter three addresses
realism; chapter five describes Prosser and consensus thought; chapter
seven deals with neoconceptualism. Into this sensible progression White
has inserted two extensive and apparently unrelated discussions, one of
Cardozo (chapter four) and one of Traynor (chapter six), neither of
whom White fits into his four-part framework. White emphasizes Car-
dozo's ability to cloak innovation in traditional language, but he neither
shows nor argues that Cardozo shared any realist views, such as a con-
tempt for general principles. Similarly, although White maintains that
Traynor relied on Prosser's work (as well as that of other scholars) in
certain areas, he makes no attempt to show that Traynor strove to catego-
rize and synthesize, as the scholars of his period allegedly were wont to
do.
III
The problems with this book, however, go beyond carelessness and im-
precision. White has set forth an interesting chronology of prominent
thinkers' ideas about torts, but he has said very little about why one torts
doctrine gave way to another, why different generations of scholars sought
different ends through tort law, or why different scholars have held differ-
ent views about the best methods of achieving the same ends.
White tries to explain the evolution of torts thinking by drawing paral-
lels between developments in the field of torts and contemporaneous devel-
opments in the American intellectual community at large. And, to be sure,
he succeeds in relating the broader intellectual currents during each of his
four periods to some aspects of what was going on in torts. He illustrates,
for example, how torts casebooks in the realist period began to reach be-
yond the opinions of appellate judges to the growing and varied body of
social science literature that legal scholars were beginning to tap.
Despite his successes, however, White cannot fully explain the particu-
lar substance of torts doctrine during any of his four periods by referring
only to the more general intellectual climate of the day. White describes
14. P. 64.
15. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
16. Pp. 99-100.
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the essential characteristic of nineteenth century conceptualist thought, for
instance, as the displacement of unifying forces such as religion and natu-
ral law by universal, "scientific" principles. This general view of concep-
tualism does explain why torts thinkers sought to develop some universal
principles of liability in the late nineteenth century. But it does nothing to
explain why they settled upon the particular negligence principle that
White identifies as the main development in tort doctrine during the con-
ceptualist period. A universal principle of strict liability or liability based
on intent would have been just as unifying as the negligence principle.
White himself recognizes that the emergence of the negligence principle
cannot be explained solely in light of the general intellectual currents
prevalent during the period, so he endeavors to supplement his explana-
tion by asserting that conceptualists sought to admonish wrongdoers. That
assertion adds a significant element to the explanation, for it provides a
goal for torts in the late nineteenth century that can be linked with the
negligence doctrine: Tort actions were to be used to discover and to punish
wrongdoers, and negligence turned on some notion of fault. But the expla-
nation remains incomplete, for the origins of the stated objective -to ad-
monish wrongdoers- are themselves unexplained. White simply asserts
the prominence of that objective, as if it suddenly appeared in the intellec-
tual rubble left by the collapse of natural law. White's purported explana-
tion of the change in torts ideas thus becomes something of a tautology:
Torts thinkers sponsored the negligence principle with its requirement of
fault because they wished to admonish bad conduct; we know they wished
to punish such conduct because they said so in adopting the negligence
standard."I
White's explanation of substantive torts development during the realist
period suffers from similar shortcomings. White explains that the realists'
preference for individualized, ad hoc judgments over universal principles,
together with their emphasis on broad social welfare concerns, led to what
he calls "interest balancing." These general notions do not, however, ex-
plain any of the three basic doctrinal shifts during this period: alteration
of the basic negligence doctrine from one based on the breach of a duty
owed by the defendant to the whole world to one based on the breach of a
duty owed only to specified individuals within some "foreseeable" range of
danger from the defendant's actions, expansion of strict liability, and the
advent of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
At first look, one might suppose that the transformation of negligence
17. White probably overstates the single-mindedness of the architects of nineteenth-century tort
law in stressing the admonition function. Conceptualist doctrine also made the plaintiff's contributory
negligence and assumption of risk absolute bars to recovery, even though neither defense furthers the
goal of admonishing defendants' blameworthy conduct.
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from breach of a universal duty to breach of a particular duty might be
explained by reference to the realists' general preference for ad hoc inter-
est balancing. A closer examination, however, shows that White would
not explain the development in this way, for he views the conceptualists'
notion of negligence as just as fact-specific and non-universal as the real-
ists'. Whereas the realists examined the particular facts of each negligence
case in order to determine whether the defendant owed a duty to the
plaintiff, the conceptualists undertook a similarly detailed and individual-
ized analysis under the rubric of "proximate cause." Moreover, White
does not even try to show that torts thinkers' beginning to examine the
scope of defendants' duty was tied to concern for the social welfare of
plaintiffs. In short, although there may have been very good reasons for
the shift from proximate cause to duty, none can be gleaned from White's
description of the transition from conceptualism to realism.
Nor can White explain the realists' shift from negligence to strict liabil-
ity solely in terms of their balancing the interests of individual litigants.
To be sure, strict liability in the twentieth century brought with it an
increased awareness of the social-welfare implications of tort law as liabil-
ity came to turn on the relationship between classes of plaintiffs and de-
fendants instead of the blameworthiness of individual defendants' conduct.
But this express consideration of the parties' status did not require a doc-
trine of strict liability. Moreover, the supposed thirst of the realists for ad
hoc judgments seems to be at odds with the broad, universal rules of lia-
bility that evolved. Whereas negligence under the realists-and even
under the conceptualists-made liability in individual cases turn on a host
of factual determinations, strict liability balanced society's interests in vast
classes of litigants, in effect deciding individual liability in a wide range of
cases by a single, universal judgment.
As with negligence in the conceptualist period, therefore, White finds it
necessary to explain the development of strict liability during the realist
period as reflecting in part an overriding goal for tort law. For the real-
ists, that goal was compensating tort victims. Unfortunately, the compen-
sation objective, like the admonition goal that White ascribes to the con-
ceptualists, seems neither to bear any particular relation to the broader
intellectual notions of the period that White describes nor even to be at
the core of contemporaneous thinking about torts in general. Two of the
substantive developments that White associates with realism-the develop-
ment of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and the
transformation of questions of proximate cause into questions of the scope
of the duty owed-have little if anything to do with compensation.
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IV
White's chronology thus appears rather arbitrary-a sequence of doc-
trinal events, some more or less plausibly related to others but none shown
to be a necessary or inevitable successor to that which preceded it. The
incompleteness of the analysis appears, in hindsight at least, to be the
inevitable consequence of White's deliberate choice to exclude from con-
sideration other forces for change that might help explain the complex
evolution of legal doctrine.18
White has chosen virtually to ignore the impact of economic or social
events on ideas. He entirely overlooks basic historical transformations that
surely must have affected tort law, both by giving rise to new circum-
stances in which old legal doctrines were to be tested and by suggesting
new purposes and interests to be served by the law. White is silent, for
example, about the possibility that strict liability for defective products
became more widespread as a result of profound changes in commercial
relationships, with consumers increasingly purchasing goods that passed
through a number of steps in the distributional chain. Similarly, although
White acknowledges that the advent of liability insurance made compen-
sation for injury less burdensome, he asserts without explanation or justi-
fication that it was merely a symptom, and not a cause, of the fundamen-
tal shift of tort doctrine away from the function of admonishing
defendants' blameworthy conduct and toward the function of compensat-
ing injured plaintiffs.
White does hint at the effects on tort law of two historical events:
America's industrialization and its war with Nazi Germany. He mini-
mizes the importance of industrialization, however, by saying that it was
important for torts only in the "limited sense" that it increased the num-
ber of torts cases involving strangers and thus led to the "intellectual re-
sponse" of imposing a duty of care independent of pre-existing relations.'
And although White refers to American intellectuals' reaction to Nazi
Germany as a motivation for their search for moral absolutes, he makes
no attempt to link that search to any substantive development in tort doc-
trine after World War II.
White not only ignores the social and economic context in which ideas
evolved, but also refuses to take seriously the substance of torts ideas
themselves. It is the substance of the ideas-the doctrines and the ways
they are articulated-that determines how they are perceived and that em-
bodies the vocabulary with which they are discussed and changed. As with
ideas or paradigms in other fields, a particular legal doctrine or theory
18. See p. xii.
19. P. 16.
1503
The Yale Law Journal
may fall out of favor, even if there has been no change in the surrounding
intellectual climate, simply because it comes to be seen as inadequate to
serve the purposes for which it was intended.20 Yet White takes no ac-
count of the success or failure of any doctrine because he refuses to take
seriously the substance of the torts doctrines that he examines.
White's treatment of Palsgraf2M is illustrative. In order to fit the "theo-
retical confrontation" 22 between Cardozo and Andrews into his conceptual
framework, White extracts from Cardozo's opinion a concern with the
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, supposedly a signifi-
cant departure from dissenting Judge Andrews' and the conceptualists'
focus on the defendant and the blameworthiness of his conduct. Thus, says
White, Palsgraf signaled a new era of "interest-balancing in discrete
cases." 23 White attributes this evolution in negligence doctrine to the
change in general intellectual fashion from conceptualism to realism.
White's analysis disregards the substance of what both Cardozo and
Andrews said they were doing in Palsgraf. Indeed, White dismisses as
merely "some ironies of the case" the facts that Cardozo's opinion was the
more rigidly doctrinal of the two and that Andrews' opinion "was explic-
itly an exercise in interest balancing."24
White would likely have had more success piecing all this together had
he begun by focusing on the particular problem posed by the case. The
problem was whether the negligent defendant was to be held liable for the
remote and unforeseeable injuries suffered by the plaintiff. As White ac-
knowledges, both Cardozo and Andrews found that the conceptualist doc-
trines of negligence and causation did not provide adequate guidance for
determining whether the defendant should be held liable.2" The catalyst to
the new doctrine articulated in Palsgraf thus appears to have been the
failure of prior doctrine; the broader intellectual trends of the realist era
are neither necessary nor sufficient to explain the change.
The inadequacy of particular doctrines or theories to serve their in-
tended purposes in resolving new disputes is especially likely to serve as
an impetus for evolution in the common law. Judicial lawmaking is, after
all, generally thought to be subject to special procedural and methodologi-
cal constraints. Judges, it is widely believed, should make only "princi-
pled" decisions based on "reasoned elaboration" from prior decisions and
20. Cf T. KUHN, THE STRU(CTURE OF SCIENTIFIc: REVOLUTIONS 66-76 (1962) (attributing Co-
pernican, Newtonian (chemical), and Einsteinian revolutions, not to any new discovery, but rather to
"a pronounced failure in the normal problem-solving activity").
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the doctrines they embrace; a variety of legal principles, often encapsu-
lated in notions of stare decisis, are intended to curb the imagination and
whim of judges by restricting their decisionmaking authority. The devel-
opment of the common law gains legitimacy through a dialectic between
ideas and decisions. One might expect, therefore, that the doctrinal formu-
lations of earlier common law decisions would be subject to rigorous ex-
amination in the course of principled decisionmaking and reasoned elabo-
ration and that a doctrine would be abandoned when that examination
disclosed inadequacies.
Yet White goes out of his way to reject any such special view of the
judicial function or the evolution of the common law. In discussing Justice
Traynor, for example, White says that what makes him a "man of 'his
time,' as distinguished from 'ours,' is his belief that the 'primary internal
characteristic of the judicial process' was that it was 'rational.' ,,26 Indeed,
White goes so far as to suggest that Traynor was disingenuous when he
professed to believe that judicial decisionmaking is uniquely rational and
objective:
Rationality can be reduced to current notions of plausibility; it does
not seem to be a timeless construct that is simply "there" to be
grasped and articulated. So unless one regards Traynor as naive-a
trait that his career belies-one is inclined to conclude that his exal-
tation of objectivity and rationality was a version of homage to the
prevailing canons of his time.2 1
Although White pays lip service to what he calls the "symbiotic" relation-
ship between judges and scholars, 28 he has not examined the impact of
precedent on scholarship. To White, ideas are "causative agents" that in-
fluence doctrine, 29 but data, in the form of doctrine, can have little influ-
ence on ideas.
Despite his failure to attribute doctrinal change to any doctrine's sub-
stantive inadequacy and his general disavowal of anything unique in the
principled, evolutionary method of common law decisionmaking, White
stops short of saying that there is no qualitative difference between judi-
cial and legislative torts doctrines. Thus, although he defines tort law to
encompass all law "concerned with civil wrongs not arising from con-
tracts,"3 White focuses almost entirely on the common law development
of torts and ignores legislative incursions into the field in areas such as the
26. P. 209.
27. P. 189.
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environment, occupational safety, workmen's compensation, antitrust, and
securities. The apparent justification for these omissions is a tacit conces-
sion that judicial decisionmaking in torts is distinctive enough to merit
extended analysis without regard to major legislative developments. But
White's methodology and his skepticism of the "rationality" of judicial
decisionmaking allow no such distinction between judicial and legislative
decisionmaking that might justify exclusion of the latter from his study.
White's approach to the evolution of legal thought should be able to ex-
plain legislative as well as judicial developments. Thus, because White
has made no effort to analyze the evolution of ideas about legislation, he
has missed an important opportunity to test his theories; more serious, his
silence leaves whole areas of tort law unexplained and casts doubt on the
significance of his sweeping notions about the relationships between intel-
lectual currents and changes in legal doctrine.
V
The key to White's failure to explain why torts ideas changed may lie
in his views about who did the changing. At the outset of his book, White
assumes that he can study torts thinking and doctrines simply by explor-
ing the work of a few individuals at what he calls "elite" institutions.
Because White offers no reason or justification for his premise, one might
suppose that he believes that institutions become "elite" when they con-
tain individuals who are leaders in their various fields and who generate
ideas, theories, and doctrines that persuade others and thereby become
prominent. But White's thinking appears to be something altogether dif-
ferent. For White, the influence of those associated with elite institutions
stems, not from their ability to persuade through reason and analysis, but
from the identity and status of the institution itself. Ideas become widely
shared simply because they happen to be fashionable at elite institutions;
only the right credential-institutional affiliation-is needed to give force
to an idea.
The depth of White's cynicism about the significance of ideas in and of
themselves appears without camouflage at both the beginning and the end
of his book. In his introduction, White asserts that his approach to intel-
lectual history "resembles that of the sociologist of knowledge" who views
the influence of leading scholars' ideas "as a sociological phenomenon,
linked not to the inherent soundness of the ideas but to the institutional
context in which they have appeared."" And at the end of his book,
White summarizes his view of 120 years of tort law, concluding that
"nothing about the subject matter . . . compels one organization of the
31. P. xiii.
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field or anbther."''1 Thus, according to White, the development of the neg-
ligence theory during the last century "was fortuitous in the sense that
negligence was congenial to a distinctive intellectual attitude of the late
nineteenth century,"33 and the later "emergence of tort law as a compen-
sation system was . . . largely fortuitous. '"'4
White's intellectual apostasy explains much that is otherwise puzzling
about his book. It is understandable that one who believes that the devel-
opment of substantive torts doctrine has been "fortuitous" will see no
point in examining those doctrines closely in order to explain how and
why they have changed. Indeed, according to White, one cannot give any
further explanation of the prominence of, say, Professor Bohlen's torts
work in the first part of this century beyond observing that he held a
prestigious post on the faculty at the Harvard Law School. To go further,
to talk about the nature of commercial relationships in America or the
opacity of the notion of proximate cause, is to obscure, not explain.
Appreciating White's cynicism about the nature and effect of ideas also
explains his peculiar (and paradoxical) distrust of legal scholarship.
White condemns neoconceptualism in part because he fears that its promi-
nence will give scholars too much power. He fears that those who articu-
late appealing concepts will "be functioning as law makers" and that their
concepts will be adopted by judges and legislatures, have the force of law,
and thereby have an impact on society. Yet, White complains, law profes-
sors are not accountable to the people-not even as accountable as ap-
pointed judges, who at least are recognized as having a profound effect on
society and therefore are subject to close public scrutiny. Thus, White
concludes, neoconceptualism should be opposed because it threatens to
confer too much power on an irresponsible elite?
But professors are not "lawmakers" in the same sense as judges: Judges
can make law by the stroke of a pen; they have power because they have
authority. Academics, by contrast, have influence measured only by the
force of their ideas. If those ideas persuade judges, lawyers, and other
scholars, then professors will have influence on doctrine; if their ideas are
unpersuasive, then the academics are powerless.
White has no confidence in the power of reason to ferret out bad ideas,
to recognize that positive analyses as such have no normative significance,
or to determine when normative analyses are not related to the factual
premises on which sound legal doctrine must be based. Instead, White's
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dominate the profession turns out to be a fear that affiliation with elite
institutions and the capacity to articulate plausible ideas give professors
unbridled power that must be checked. White proposes to provide this
check, not through intellectual scrutiny by the public, judges, or lawyers,
but rather by assaulting the intellectual citadel itself.
White's fear of those who speak for elite institutions seems greatly ex-
aggerated. His own chronology of torts thinkers belies his assertion that it
is enough, in order to understand ideas about torts, to examine the theo-
ries of persons affiliated with specified elite institutions. Indeed, even
White has found it necessary to study and recognize the prominence of
persons-notably Prosser and Green-who were not affiliated with any of
the institutions that White would evidently deem to be elite.
More important, however, is the inadequacy of institutional affilia-
tion-whatever institutions are included-as an explanation of the preva-
lence of certain ideas. Affiliation with elite institutions cannot itself deter-
mine prominence of thought because elite institutions do not speak with
one voice. White himself has identified four different scholars prominent
in the 1970s, each of whom has a different view of tort law that cannot be
reconciled with those of the others. Two of these scholars, Calabresi and
Posner, emphasize efficiency objectives; the other two, Epstein and Fletch-
er, stress the admonition function of tort law. Epstein and Posner both
teach at the University of Chicago, and all four presumably share what
White regards as a sufficient nexus with elite institutions to be included in
his survey. Yet White is unable to tell us which if any of their theories
will have the greatest impact on torts doctrine or torts thinking during the
neoconceptualist period.
In order to explain ideas, one must take ideas seriously and analyze
their substance, the context in which they arose, and the process that gave
them life. Some ideas are more sound than others; some, better than
others, meet the needs that brought them forth. Because White has not
taken ideas about torts seriously, because he has treated ideas and doctrine
as little more than artifacts of contemporary fashion, he has been unable
to explain why they have evolved as they have. It is White's intellectual
nihilism that, in the end, has doomed his analysis to failure and so limited
the value of his study.
1508
Vol. 90: 1497, 1981
